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Abstract
In the complex of motivating variables that define the push and pull factors behind
recruitment and participation in civil conflict, "radicalization"—or "violent extremism"—is
not conceived as a very strong motive, as is the case with studies on terrorism. As part of
disarming youth combatants,the linkages between reintegration outcomes and possible
rerecruitment into radical and extremist violence must be better understood to mitigate
such risks. In our analysis, the policies guiding reintegration of child soldiers and youth
should be better attuned to the relationship between recruitment motivations and
reintegration outcomes, and must be approached from a political lens rather than a purely
technical one. The risk of radicalization and involvement in violent extremism is ultimately
a structural challenge, which needs to address root causes of recruitment rather than
trying to find a solution through a band-aid approach of stopgap reintegration assistance.
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Abstract
In the complex of motivating variables that define the push and pull factors behind recruitment and participation in civil conflict, "radicalization"—or "violent extremism"—is not conceived as a very strong motive,
as is the case with studies on terrorism. As part of disarming youth combatants, the linkages between reintegration outcomes and possible rerecruitment into radical and extremist violence must be better understood to mitigate such risks. In our analysis, the policies guiding reintegration of child soldiers and youth should be better attuned to the
relationship between recruitment motivations and reintegration outcomes, and must be approached from a political lens rather than a purely
technical one. The risk of radicalization and involvement in violent
extremism is ultimately a structural challenge, which needs to address
root causes of recruitment rather than trying to find a solution through a
band-aid approach of stopgap reintegration assistance.

Introduction
The micro-level empirical approach to civil war seeks to better understand the dynamics of recruitment and participation of youth in armed
groups.1 In this literature, as shown in Figure 1, the recruitment of adult
and child combatants is often based on a combination of reasons. These
can be categorized as a compendium of "push" and "pull" factors, ranging
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from environment, structural violence, coercion, poverty, education and
employment, family and friends, politics and ideology, to culture and tradition. Culturally, being a soldier may be traditionally coveted, and joining the military a much desired career. In some instances, youth may
volunteer to avenge the death of a close family member or to defend their
community. Children and adults may also join armed groups to bring
back food or other material goods to support their families. Violence and
the symbolic power of the gun can become a source of authority over parents and elders, reconfiguring the need for obedience, compliance, and
respect that for generations has been inculcated into youth to perpetuate
a gerontocratic hierarchy. Nonetheless, in this complex of motivating
variables "radicalization"—or "violent extremism"—is not conceived as a
very strong motive for youth recruitment, as is the case with studies on
terrorism.
Within the context of violent extremism, Islamic radicalization in Europe,
the threat of terrorism, and changing demographic trends in European
cities due to a steady flow of immigrants have been at the center of academic and policy attention in recent years.2 Increasingly, there have been
efforts at interpreting the Koran to generate a tailored genealogy of radicalization. These have imparted a specific Islamic flavor to political violence, especially among youth. Right-wing radicalism in Norway, which
was witnessed in the gruesome shooting of teenagers at the political camp
of the ruling party, is a chilling testament to the variants of radicalism
existing in the West. Hence, Islamic radicalism, while it has been at the
center of much political and policy interest, may not be the only source of
radicalized violence that threatens Western society.
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Figure 1: Participation Pathways in Civil Conflict

In Southeast Asia, the 2009 suicide bombings in Jakarta by two Indonesian youths, Dani Dwi Permana and Nana Ikhwana Maulana, fall into the
broader mold of terrorist recruitment and radicalization by organized
outfits such as Darul Islam and Jemaah Islamiyah in the region. Separatist groups, such as the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM), the Organisasi
Pembebasan Papua (OPM), and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
(MILF) also use religious appeals to motivate participation. The role of
charismatic and influential leadership in recruiting youth is also critical.3
The U.S. National Intelligence Council's 2020 Project, Mapping the Global Future, has reported a strong incidence of youth bulges in Arab states
and growing radicalization of this demographic group.4 This has also
been an increasing trend among Muslim diaspora communities in the
United States.5 Low levels of education as well as stunted access to socioeconomic improvement have exacerbated this phenomenon in fragile polities such as Pakistan. The majority of radicalized youth in such countries
are motivated to join violent organizations due to feelings of alienation
from larger society, and as a function of socio-economic deprivation.6
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Radical tendencies are closely identified with the idea of extremism,
which in turn is aimed at unprecedented social overhaul. Given the skills
that youth combatants have in the security sector, the ex-combatants can
be important recruits for transnational terrorist organizations. Hence disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) policy needs to
address this vulnerability, particularly in the context of regional instability and the interconnectedness of modern conflicts. The phenomenon of
recidivism has been well-documented in the South Asian and West African regions and may hold true for the Middle East in its current turmoil.
Civilian unrest in response to years of authoritarian regimes has
unleashed a new mode of social protest, which has important implications
for DDR practice. Therefore, this paper undertakes a conceptual scoping
of interrelationships between disarming child soldiers and rehabilitating
youth engaged in radical protest or violent extremism.
Our main argument here is that current DDR approaches are oblivious to
the linkage between reintegration outcomes and re-recruitment into violent extremism. Although there is much effort to break chains of command, regional security architecture in countries like Afghanistan and
Pakistan is complex. The borders are porous, and DDR programs pay
mere lip service to the overwhelming challenge of security.

Push and Pull Factors in Recruitment of
Youth into Conflict
From a micro-economics lens, material recruitment incentives offered by
rebellious organizations for youth are relatively weak. Youth often require
less money and do not receive a big share of the looted items, and this is
due to their dependence on senior commanders for protection, patronage,
and support. Their affiliational bonding with the group and its leadership
flows essentially from feelings of protection, security, and non-pecuniary
rewards, such as honor and duty, revenge, a sense of purpose, or protection from violence.7 Hence, armed groups with few or limited resources
forcibly recruit young adolescents because they offer the optimal combination of effectiveness and ease of retention.8 Some of the underlying
variables of child soldiering which lend greater nuance to grasping the
scope and extent of the problem pertain to the nature of conflicts (high or
low intensity, cross-border or internal), the patterns and nature of
recruitment (seeking food, security, or employment; seeking revenge;
being encouraged by family or community; or forced abduction), as well
as the experiences of the children (being involved in active fighting, sexual
exploitation, their role being valorized, or their experience featuring
abuse).9 In fact, children serving as a new pool of military labor have
66
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raised issues within the domain of labor economics—in particular, how
involuntary military service provided by abducted children impacts the
labor market.10
There also exists a need to disaggregate between direct experiences of
participation and the over-arching risks to which children in armed
conflict zones are exposed. Strang et al. allude to the presence of a
mixture of discrete risks, including attack and displacement, and chronic
risks, such as poverty and lack of access to regular schooling and health
care.11 In order to mitigate their impacts, Kostelny offers a riskaccumulation model to structure the challenge facing children in conflict
and post-conflict situations.12 The model includes emotional, social,
spiritual, and physical impacts on children and youth, while levels of both
risk and the impact of conflict are ordered along three significant points,
namely the family, community, and society.
At the level of family, children witness the loss of loved ones, separation
from family units, or a lack of care on account of the exigencies of war
zones. At the level of community, abduction and coercive recruitment in
Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Uganda, among other cases, have established a
trend where children have been captured and forced to attack their neighbors and commit atrocities against their own kith and kin, disrupting
social relations, breeding mistrust, and creating enormous problems for
the eventual return to the community. At the societal level, agency factors
become important. In Sierra Leone and Liberia, for instance, the civil conflicts were in part a product of youth marginalization, patrimonialism,
and power monopolization in the hands of a few "big men." Social inequality, injustice, and lack of social mobility resulted from this exclusionism and fueled dissent.13

Radicalization
Radicalization is a key theme in terrorism discourses and is well
documented in recent literature on youth and politics.14 Radicalization
has been approached as a psycho-social process of gradual progress from
context, to thought, and finally to action. Hence, it requires micro
(individual) and macro (societal/cultural) examination of context-specific
variables to explain causation.15 Concepts of radicalism and terrorism are
often conflated; in our understanding, the term radicalization refers to
the process of developing extremist ideologies and beliefs. Ideological
advocacy for racial or religious supremacy and opposition to the
egalitarian principles of democracy mark radical thought and action.
These processes are closely related to participation or action pathways,
67
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namely the process of engaging in terrorism or violent extremist actions.
Some of the push-and-pull factors identified as central to youth
recruitment in civil conflict are also relevant to engagement in violent
extremism.
In the case of child soldiers, joining an armed group as an act of agency
and volition is underplayed in contemporary popular accounts of child
recruitment. However, joining either the rebel group or the government
forces in a contested territory can become the only route to survival, offering protection from torture, abuse, and politically instigated killings. In
other cases, family and community itself can be important agents by
encouraging enrollment as part of military culture, which may be embedded in local concepts of community defense. In many communities, adolescent youth play a critical role in communal defense, one that is
expected as an essential and natural part of their transition into adulthood. In a few instances, joining a faction could aid in family reunification, especially in a countryside characterized by roaming and raiding
"soldier men." Arming oneself with a weapon improves the chances of
successful attempts to locate and rescue estranged family. Additionally,
controlling the deployment of violence assists in movement and provides
access to public services when official facilities have ceased. Invoking a
community approach can identify risk factors to child recruitment. While
these triggers are built into the structure of conflicts, it is also important
to address the resilience and coping mechanisms that youth are supposed
to learn with age that provide important capacities to avoid recruitment.
The role of the family and community is often a critical factor in the normative development of youth and their involvement in extremism.
Recruitment into violent extremism may involve radicalization and subsequent recruitment. Some debate exists among contemporary scholars,
however, about the nature and extent of terrorist recruitment, at least as it
relates to militant jihad. Established patterns of recruitment have not
been reported for organizations like al-Qaida. Voluntary enlistment, at
times mediated through kin relationships or immediate family, is the key
mode of participation for "militants." Traditional recruitment patterns,
such as conscription or dedicated military service, do not seem to be the
norm in such organizations. Islamist militants seek new supporters, activists, and members that they engage in active efforts; this pattern influences others to adopt their point of view.16
Exposure to conflict, coupled with the lack of a strong family or community, can be key factors for children to participate in violence. This is often
the case when combatants experienced maltreatment of factions directly
or indirectly, or have lost family members in a protracted conflict. These
68

https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol4/iss4/4
DOI: <p>http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.4.4.3</p>

Özerdem and Podder: Disarming Youth Combatants: Mitigating Youth Radicalization and V

Disarming Youth Combatants: Mitigating Youth Radicalization and Violent Extremism

issues of grief and grievances can cumulatively encourage, or enhance, the
propensity on the part of youth to join an armed group. Lack of access to
socio-economic opportunities, especially being in a situation of chronic
poverty, can make involvement in extremism a way out of social marginality. In certain circumstances, poverty-induced marginality may be reinforced by a lure of ideology, especially when recruiters harp on
perceptions and experiences of injustice. This has been the case in several
conflicts, such as Colombia, Nepal, and in India's Maoist affected states.
Direct and indirect benefits deriving from participation are an important
issue in the recruitment of combatants, particularly in environments
where conflict has a strong characteristic of greed and clientelism. In the
first instance, it might not seem to be too relevant for the involvement in
extremism, but a "martyr" who fought with a group such as Hezbollah can
bring many kudos and direct benefits to the family. This sense of social
status and contribution to an important cause in conflicts where selfsacrifice to a nationalist or religious cause can merit respect, or even
divinity, can also influence the decision of youth and their family towards
participation in radical violence.
Most of the literature on radicalization into violent extremist ideologies
(particularly those that support terrorism) is conceptual, rather than
empirical.17 While the exact sequence of these changes is debatable, different pathways and mechanisms operate for different people. A more
nuanced understanding of how this process operates, both between and
within groups, will enable us to develop more informed policies and practices to mitigate and prevent the propagation of violent extremism.
There are many possible theoretical-analytic frameworks that might be
applied to the radicalization process. Crossett and Spitaletta identify sixteen theories that have been proposed to explain the causal chain leading
to radicalization.18 Prominent among these are social-movement theory,
social psychology, and conversion theory. These operate at both the
macro and micro levels. Yet there is little investigation into the dimension
of how negative reintegration outcomes for former child soldiers may
encourage their radicalization and subsequent recruitment into violent
extremism. We explore this theme further.
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Reintegration Outcomes and the Problem of
Radicalization or Re-recruitment into Violent
Extremism
Apart from the recruitment pathways and motivations discussed above,
the successes and failures in the reintegration of former combatants and
child soldiers also play a significant role in their possible radicalization
and participation in violent extremism. Group socialization can be a
powerful mechanism for changing the identities of young people, and
thus transforming children into soldiers. This has important implications
for post-conflict civilian life, especially with respect to the challenges of
regaining lost childhoods, family, loved ones, and norms of social
behavior. In long conflicts, such as those in Guatemala, Sierra Leone, and
Liberia, members who join as children and demobilize as adults suffer
from long-term in-group socialization. This socialization has important
consequences for post-war reintegration outcomes because it impinges on
some key post-war behavioral indicators with respect to mental-healthrelated disorders, such as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD),
disability, and reproductive atrophy. Apart from medical problems, the
loss of education, a lack of employable skills, and the destruction of a
stable family life are all important negative fallouts from a life spent in an
armed group.
Becoming a soldier marks a transition away from the normal and
accepted; hence, returning to a prior set of rules can be a significant challenge. Traditional interventions, involving ritualistic cleansing and sacrifice in societies with strong communitarian visions of death, illness, and
healing can help to create a socially acceptable return. Traditional cleansing rituals, such as the organic interventions witnessed in Mozambique
can be critical for the onset of reintegration processes. They are meant to
spiritually realign well-being with the social world and discard identities
and habits imbibed in the fighters' world.
What are the options for re-socializing children from their soldier identity? Present approaches to reintegration seem to overlook the importance of process and do not emphasize the social elements of
reintegration. A return to the norms and values of pre-conflict society can
undermine efforts to engender greater acceptability. Reintegrating combatants experience an inversion of values, in which killing, amputation,
and other forms of horrific violence are no longer desirable. What had
become accepted forms of behavior during war are considered reprehensible in peace-time, which undermines the sense of identity and courage
that youth had created as fighters. There are "good" and "bad" rebels, in
70
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some respects. Distrust and fear of child soldiers are common in civilian
communities, even years after war ends. It is difficult to discard rebel-like
behavior and to reorient oneself to the reality, poverty, or incapacity of
civilian living.
At the same time, child soldiers remain in some respect victims of their
past. Violence is an entrenched reality of their lives, and it is the most
destructive element since reliance on violence to secure what in a free
society can be secured institutionally or rightfully, remains a key challenge in the identity transformation process. In some contexts, organic
approaches, especially traditional cleansing ceremonies, have helped
repair relationships with their families and communities in order to
realign their well-being with spiritual beliefs of death and rebirth. Such
ritualistic rebirth and cleansing eases return and enhances community
trust in its own youth, who are perceived as spiritually polluted through
exposure to violence and death during war-time. This element of successful social reintegration and re-acceptance by their families and communities needs to be emphasized as a preventive mechanism for rerecruitment into violent extremism.
At a more technical level, with respect to DDR efforts, child soldiers have
traditionally been excluded from DDR programs and reintegration support in particular. Efforts at stopgap programs have targeted these
excluded youth by giving them priority in family reunification, counseling, basic economic assistance in the form of short vocational training
programs, and provision for shelter, food, and tools. Community-based
reintegration (CBR) strategies attempted in the context of child soldier
reintegration seem better poised to tackle the need for balance in targeting and mitigating animosities stemming from exclusive focus on any particular caseload.
The preventive capacity of communities is central to discouraging rerecruitment into violent extremism. The criticism of CBR approaches as
relegating responsibility for reintegration to impoverished and incapacitated communities is underlined; however, the positives of this strategy
lie in ensuring community-located follow-up mechanisms and more effective use of donor and local resources. If communities are provided adequate resources and get support from the state and central government,
and if they are able to identify, gauge and prioritize needs locally, then
they will be able to respond to those needs more effectively. It is vital that
credence is paid to building this capacity. Children benefit from returning
to an environment that encourages them to lead a normal life, to return to
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education, and witness stability. The primary challenge here is positively
engaging a rich pool of human resources for development, rather than remarginalizing child soldiers.
The angle of power and agency in youth participation, and ways in which
post-conflict reintegration strategies impact elements of individual action
and trajectories of empowerment, is a topic for further investigation.
Social navigation can be understood as motion within a fluid space, and it
requires individual agency in deciding on how to navigate the dangers and
the possibilities, as well as an ability to locate and creatively traverse a difficult social space. Social navigation and post-conflict power are an
important yet little understood dimension in the reintegration trajectories
of child soldiers. At the same time, the implications of DDR and reintegration outcomes on radicalization and involvement in violent extremism
need to be mulled in greater depth.
In post-conflict societies, child soldiers are susceptible to
disempowerment, marginalization, and a return to erstwhile structures of
traditional leadership, control, and domination. How do youth negotiate
this sudden change in status? The loss of education, a lack of
employment, and the pejorative label of child soldier makes successful
reintegration a difficult challenge. At the same time, where then does
reintegration support figure into the process? And more importantly,
what can it do for youth returning to their dilapidated communities?
Support can be directed towards individual child soldiers themselves, or it
can help those who seek to develop infrastructure by allocating funds to
schools for the benefit of children in the community as a whole. One of the
lessons drawn from recent reintegration experiences in Nepal and Sudan
is that instead of providing comprehensive reintegration packages for
individual child soldiers, it is important to locate that support in the
family and community, thus creating and enabling an empowered
environment for the reintegration of returning child soldiers.
In light of the complicated matrix which informs reintegration success,
youths' re-engagement into violence in the post-war period can be motivated by a combination of factors. These may range from a certain loss of
agency, victimization, and revenge attacks to issues of physical and economic insecurity. Grievances or a feeling of exclusion, i.e., lack of access
to education, lack of employment, trauma, and political and social marginalization, are important motivations for recruitment and also explain
re-recruitment triggers. In the absence of physical security, former soldiers who continue to feel isolated and unintegrated resort to violence in
an attempt to solve their problems.19 With few avenues for social
advancement in post-conflict contexts plagued by gerontocratic and cor72
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rupt societies, war often becomes a plausible route to empowerment,
especially for marginalized groups such as male youth.20 This was the
case in Algeria, Liberia, and Sierra Leone.21 When in the aftermath of
peace processes young demobilized soldiers found themselves reintegrating into poverty, or into a similar situation of political, economic, and
social marginalization as experienced in the pre-war period, many
returned to combat as mercenaries in regional conflicts.22 Also, in several
conflicts like Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Uganda, child soldiers brutalized
their own communities, at times under the orders of superiors, with the
view of burning their bridges with family and the home environment.
Others were directed to raid their own villages, loot food, mutilate people,
or even kill their own relatives.
The instrumental and technical emphasis of DDR remains focused on
numbers, caseloads, targets, partners, trauma, protection, and rehabilitation. These only superficially address the underlying cause of conflicts
and incompletely contribute to reintegration success. DDR approaches
remain mired in instrumentalism; the means and end results are instrumental and are geared towards keeping a certain caseload perceived as a
"security threat" busy and engaged to prevent conflict relapse. Besides,
there are significant negative impacts of DDR programs for child soldiers.
They can result in labeling, stigma, distrust, and animosity at an intergroup level within rural communities.
A critical focus of DDR policy should be towards engaging youth in
leadership structures to enable continued engagement of young people in
socio-political ventures and positive peace building. This aspect can help
mitigate potential radicalization or re-recruitment. Successful socioeconomic reintegration can help weaken command and control
structures, given that former commanders can be potential recruiters for
violent extremist activities. In countries where DDR programs have been
successful, new social relationships forged through training and schooling
have encouraged youth to think strategically and opt for civilian
livelihoods instead of re-engaging in violence. This underlines the need
for addressing the push and pull factors which motivate recruitment in
the first place. The persistence of inequalities, grievances, and a return to
poverty creates a disappointment with conflict participation and a sense
of loss, which might encourage susceptibility to radical ideologies.
This overview of the correlation between reintegration outcomes and rerecruitment directs towards the following recommendations. First of all,
the main policy focus on preventing re-recruitment must be a combination of comprehensive reintegration benefits rooted in community-based
support structures, effective border monitoring, and the creation of politi73

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012

Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 4, No. 4

Journal of Strategic Security

cal and social leadership opportunities for youth, thereby undermining
their possible exclusion, and thus re-marginalization. Second, it is important to monitor sites of re-recruitment, such as ex-combatant communities or settlements, which have higher ex-combatant populations. These
locations are a common feature of many post-conflict countries, where
familiarity and war-time social networks persist and dictate resettlement
preferences. Similarly, camps for displaced populations are also potent
sites for re-recruitment, and thus need to be monitored effectively. The
ultimate goal is to return displaced people and reunite them with their
families and home communities. Finally, the presence of radical groups or
regional terror networks can also provide the contextual possibilities for
re-recruitment, and these need to be undermined by political and development actors.

Conclusion
Those faced with the task of reintegration often confront the ultimate
question of "reintegration into what," as this process exposes the most
significant assumption made by DDR programs, which is the existence of
a "home" and "community." This is particularly significant for young
combatants and child soldiers because their normative years were spent
within the structures of an armed group. The idea of going back "home" is
often not more than an illusion. However, it is through this illusion that
many young combatants are expected to go through the major identity
transformation process from combatant to re-integrated civilian in a postconflict environment. Consequently, behind the disguise of reintegration,
many young people with violent pasts are left to their own devices to
rebuild a new life. Some of them indeed do build a new life, but some
struggle and fail. Considering that the way DDR of youth and child soldiers takes place in highly damaged, polarized, and fragile socio-economic
and political environments of war-torn societies, those who fail in finding
a place for themselves in the post-conflict society are left at the mercy of
gangs, criminal networks, and radical groups for re-recruitment.
Former youth combatants tend to be a major legacy of conflicts, left
behind as a further threat to the security of society. Both for microinsecurity, in terms of their involvement in crime and violence at the local
level, and macro-insecurity, in terms of similar involvement in the
international arena, the failures in reintegration can lead to recruitment
into radical groups. However, to understand this relationship better it is
important to fully consider the "pull and push" factors that were discussed
at the beginning of this paper. The re-recruitment of former child soldiers
would rely on similar push and pull factors, but the agency of "former
74
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combatant" here requires particular attention. This is because at the rerecruitment stage, the former combatant is somebody who has
experienced violence as an instigator, and this experience is valuable to
radical groups. However, as argued within the push and pull factors
framework, the agency of former combatant would become a risk for
security if there are fertile conditions and interests for their recruitment.
This involves the role of intermediaries, conflict entrepreneurs, and
organizers of violence. Nevertheless, in conceptualizing the relationship
between the presence of radical groups and former combatants who are
not fully reintegrated into post-conflict society, it is important to
construct it as a cumulative interaction rather than a causal one.
Rather than considering the failure of reintegration programs as the main
cause of re-recruitment into radicalization, it would be much more effective to consider how failings in reintegration would feed into the existing
push and pull factors of a particular society. In the event of recruitment
into a radical group, the outcome of reintegration programs and existing
push and pull factors feed into each other. For example, in post-conflict
Liberia, thousands of former child soldiers roam the streets of Monrovia,
homeless, unemployed, and frustrated. Although some of them are
involved in petty crime, they are not yet considered a security threat for
radicalization at the national and international levels. This is because
there is no radical group or organization at the local or regional level
actively engaged in recruitment. However, this is not true in other contexts, such as Mindanao in the Philippines, Iraq, Lebanon, Afghanistan,
and possibly now in the Middle East and North Africa region in relation to
the impact of the recent "Arab Spring." Furthermore, it is important to
note that the successful reintegration of child soldiers is not adequate to
prevent them from being radicalized in the future. Past grievances can be
a lingering yet significant factor in joining an extremist group.
Therefore, in order to reduce the likeliness of re-recruitment by radical
groups, it is necessary to consider three fundamental principles. First, the
reintegration of child soldiers and youth should be seen as part and parcel
of their families and communities, and consequently, address one of the
major push and pull factors that play a role in such recruitment. Second,
the issue of reintegration should be seen through a political lens rather
than a purely technical one. The power dynamics of finding a social and
political role for former combatants in post-conflict environments is if not
more, at least as important as the opportunities of employment and education. Finally, the risk of radicalization and involvement in violent
extremism is ultimately a structural challenge, and its main causes should
be sought in the bigger picture of macro-level economics, politics, and
international relations. In other words, rather than trying to find a solu75
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tion to the manifestation of a phenomenon through a band-aid approach
and seeing war-affected youth from a purely security perspective, the
approach should start with questioning and addressing the macro-level
structural dynamics.
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